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INTRODUCTION
As I write this comment in late fall of 2009, news broadcasts and
broadsheets are filled with stories about the meeting of the members of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen
scheduled for December 2009.1 The stories reflect much of the tenor of the
public’s concerns about the environment over the past couple of decades:
expressions of anxiety about the urgent need for fundamental policy
initiatives are paired with continued contestations of the underlying science
on climate change and disputes about which countries ought to do more.
What is relatively new to these debates is a focus on tax policy. In
particular, media coverage and activist blogs have explored the possibility
of and the need for a carbon tax, or some alternative policy instrument such
as a cap and trade program, from every conceivable angle.2 Although
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1. COP15 United Nations Climate Change Conference Copenhagen 2009, http://en.cop15.dk/.
See, e.g., John Heilprin, Tens of Thousands Rally in Copenhagen, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 12,
2009,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/climate-change/tens-of-thousands-rally-in
copenhagen/article1398383/; Shawn McCarthy, Copenhagen fell victim to a world divided, THE GLOBE
AND MAIL, Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/climate-change/copenhagenfell-victim-to-a-world-divided/article1406933/; Eric Reguly, African Countries Stage Three-Hour
Boycott
in
Copenhagen,
THE
GLOBE
AND
MAIL,
Dec.
14,
2009,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/climate-change/african-countries-stage-three-hourboycott-n-copenhagen/article1400300/; Andrew C. Revkin & James Kanter, No Slowdown of Global
Warming,
Agency
Says,
THE
NEW
Y ORK
TIMES,
Dec.
8,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/science/earth/09climate.html?scp=12&sq=copenhagen%20climate
%20change&st=cse; Andrew C. Revkin and John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks, THE
NEW
Y ORK
TIMES,
Dec.
19,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/20accord.html?scp=20&sq=copenhagen%20climate
%20change&st=cse; Tom Zeller Jr., At Climate Talks, a Week of Posturing, THE N EW YORK TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/business/energy-environment/14iht-green14.html.
2. See, e.g., Exelon’s John Rowe: The Pragmatic Businessman, Favors Cap-and-Trade Over
EPA, GREEN ENERGY REPORTER, Oct. 14, 2009, http://greenenergyreporter.com/2009/10/exelonsjohn-rowe-the-pragmatic-businessman-favors-cap-and-trade-over-epa/; Tim Haab, Another Esteemed
Economist's Views on Cap and Trade, Carbon Taxes and the Double Dividend, THE ENERGY
COLLECTIVE, Sept. 30, 2009, http://theenergycollective.com/TheEnergyCollective/48912; Matthew
McDermott, Do Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Advocates Both Miss the Point of How to Best Beat
Global Warming?, TREEH UGGER, May 19, 2009, http://www.treehugger.com/files/2009/05/do-cap-and-
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public discussions about using the tax system as an instrument for the
promotion of sound environmental policy are relatively new, scholars have
been exploring the use of tax incentives to change behavior for the benefit
of the environment for decades.3 Janet Milne’s article in this volume of the
Vermont Law Review makes a fine contribution to that scholarship.
Professor Milne’s article reviews five tax provisions that may change
taxpayer behavior and advance the cause of watershed protection: Internal
Revenue Code section 126,4 which allows taxpayers to exclude some
payments from income if the payment relates to soil and water
conservation; section 175,5 which permits a deduction for expenses related
to preventing erosion of soil and water; section 170(h),6 which grants a
charitable deduction for the donation of perpetual conservation easements,
the state-provided property tax relief for agricultural land valuation; and
section 180,7 which enables the deduction of the cost of fertilizer. Professor
Milne concludes by assessing the effectiveness of the provisions in
improving the quality of the watershed and finds most of the programs to be
wanting.
Professor Milne’s piece makes two important contributions to the
literature on using the tax system as an instrument for environmental
trade-and-carbon-tax-advocates-both-miss-the-point.php; Michael Ricciardi, Reducing CO2: ‘Cap
and
Trade’
or
‘Fee
and
Dividend’?,
ECOWORDLY,
Dec.
25,
2009,
http://ecoworldly.com/2009/12/25/reducing-carbon-cap-and-trade-or-fee-and-dividend/. See also, The
Story
of
Stuff
Project,
THE
STORY
OF
CAP
&
TRADE,
http://www.youtube.com/user/storyofstuffproject#p/a/u/0/9GorqroigqM (a popular internet-based video
offering a critical analysis of cap and trade proposals).
3. For more recent contributions see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, and David M. Uhlmann,
Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than
Cap and Trade, U of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 117 (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1109167; Nathalie J. Chalifour, Advancing Biodiversity Conservation

In Canada Through Ecological Fiscal Reform - The Current Situation and Future
Potential, CRITICAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: VOLUME II – LNTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Kurt Deketelaere, Janet Milne, Larry Kreiser and Hope Ashiabor eds.,

Oxford University Press 2006); David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CANADIAN TAX
JOURNAL 6, 2063, U OF TORONTO, PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER N O. 03-03 (2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=593224; CRITICAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, VOLUME VII (LinHeng Lye, Janet Milne, Hope Ashiabor, Kurt Deketelaere & Larry Kreiser eds., Oxford University
Press 2009); Gilbert E. Metcalf and David A. Weisbach, Design of a Carbon Tax, U OF CHICAGO LAW
& ECONOMICS, OLIN WORKING PAPER N O. 447, U OF CHICAGO, PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER NO.
254 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324854; Faye Woodman, The Taxation of
Aquaculture in Canada: A Comparison with the Taxation of Agriculture and Its Policy Implications,
AQUACULTURE LAW AND POLICY: TOWARDS PRINCIPLED ACCESS AND O PERATIONS, 244-268 (David
L. VanderZwaag and Gloria Chao eds., Routledge 2006).
4. 26 USC § 126.
5. 26 USC § 175.
6. 26 USC § 170(h).
7. 26 USC § 180.
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protection. First, she focuses on one relatively discrete aspect of the
environment that is badly in need of attention: watershed pollution. Given
this discrete focus, Professor Milne is able to work concretely with the tax
policy and tax provisions that might influence behavior in a way that would
affect watershed quality. Her article thus raises specific, immediate, and
important questions about how tax policy might be reshaped to better serve
environmental needs, thereby avoiding the flaws that can arise when
scholars broach topics that are far too broad for any sensible analysis.
Indeed, many of the tax sections she reviews have not been subject to
serious scholarly review.
Second, Professor Milne centers the watershed. Many legal scholars
centre “the law” and as a consequence close off possible avenues for
addressing real world problems. In this article, Professor Milne locates the
environmental challenge at the heart of her paper, centering the watershed
in her analysis, and then looks to which policy instruments, including tools
of tax policy, might have an impact on our response to its preservation (or
might contribute to its continued degradation).
If Professor Milne’s article is a watershed, this comment is more like a
meandering stream. I offer two modest, unrelated reflections. First, I
review the standard method for evaluating tax expenditures measures;
measures like the ones identified by Professor Milne. The point of this
review is simply to highlight that the provisions reviewed by Professor
Milne may be analyzed using traditional budgetary criteria in a way that
may help evaluate their effectiveness. Second, in order to underline the
importance of comparative work in this area of the law, this comment sets
out some of the alternative choices the Canadian legislature has made in
designing Canada’s equivalent tax provision to section 170(h),8 which
permits a charitable deduction for the donation of perpetual conservation
easements.
I. THE USEFUL ROLE FOR TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
As Professor Milne notes, a fulsome analysis of the environmental
impact of the five tax provisions she identifies is beyond the scope of her
article. This section of the comment builds on her article by elaborating
slightly on the appropriate framework for undertaking that more definitive
analysis. It is a fundamental tax policy insight, widely attributed to Stanley
Surrey, that two types of provisions comprise tax legislation.9 Some of the
8. Supra note 6.
9. Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard
University Press 1974).
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provisions might best be conceptualized as technical tax provisions. The
purpose of these provisions is to raise revenue and to assist in achieving the
government’s distributive goals. These provisions define the essential
elements of the tax system: the base, rate, unit, period, and rules of
administration. Generally speaking, tax policy scholars evaluate these
technical rules of an income tax system by considering whether they
promote equity and efficiency, and whether they are administrable.
A second category of tax provisions are explicitly designed not to raise
revenue, but instead to provide implicit subsidies to those who behave in
ways that the government wishes to encourage or who are deemed to be
entitled to some form of relief because of their circumstances. Referred to
as tax expenditures, these provisions are the functional equivalent of direct
spending programs. Instead of simply writing a check to a program
recipient, programs delivered through tax legislation enable the government
to essentially offset the taxpayer’s tax check against the government’s
subsidy check. In other words, the intended recipient pays less tax, which
is functionally equivalent to paying the required tax and then receiving a
subsidy check from the government. Each of the rules described in
Professor Milne’s article might be best described as tax expenditures: in
each case, they are really just spending programs that the government
delivers through the tax system. To illustrate, instead of offering taxpayers
who donate conservation easements a charitable tax deduction, the
government could tax them on the value of the capital gain associated with
the disposition of the property and then provide them with a check of some
amount in recognition of, and to encourage, their donation.
Characterizing these kinds of environmental provisions as tax
expenditures gives their analysis some additional punch, for two reasons.
One reason might be broadly characterized as psychological: if people
think that what is being received by others is “just a tax break” they might
be less critical about whether the spending program is appropriately
designed and delivered. For example, if we know that our neighbor gets a
tax break because he puts in new, energy efficient windows, we might be
inclined to think that it’s a fair provision because broadly speaking we think
paying less tax is good. If instead he received the same amount as a check
from the government, we might be inclined to ask whether that payment is
the best use of government money. Perhaps that money might be better
spent on playgrounds, or schools, or health care. Perhaps it could be better
targeted. Our thinking about the appropriateness of the program changes
although what the government has done is functionally the same.
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Second, thinking of these programs as tax expenditures encourages us
to bring the more rigorous evaluative criteria for budgetary programs to
bear. Those budgetary criteria have been refined over the years, but as a
general matter their application requires asking a range of relatively
straightforward questions. First, tax scholars and policy makers look to
determine whether the government has a reasonable policy objective that is
being served by the tax provision and the priority of that objective in
relation to other government spending needs. Second, budgetary analysis
encourages scholars and policy makers to consider the broad range of
possible instruments that might be used to achieve the relevant objectives
including direct spending programs, regulation, direct provision of
particular benefits, educational programs, and so on. Third, if a tax
provisions is to be used to achieve the objective, tax expenditure analysis
encourages the analyst to conceptualize it as functionally equivalent to a
spending program in evaluating its design features. Once conceptualized as
equivalent to a spending program, an obvious range of questions might be
asked about the provision:
(1) Whether the provision is fair. Does the spending program
disproportionately benefit high- or low-income earners, women
or men, people in different geographical regions of the country
and so on?
(2) Whether the provision is efficient. Does it reach the intended
beneficiaries? Does it reward people who would have engaged in
the particular behavior absent the spending program (i.e. is it
target inefficient)? Does it encourage people to engage in or
avoid the intended behavior?
(3) Whether the provision can be administered efficiently. Does
it cost an excessive amount to administer? Is it administered by
the right government body? Do taxpayers know about the
incentive? Is it easy for them to understand and apply for?

II. COMPARING ALTERNATIVE DESIGN APPROACHES TO THE CHARITABLE
DEDUCTION FOR CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
One of the five tax provisions reviewed by Professor Milne is the
charitable deduction for perpetual conservations easements offered by
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section 170(h).10 This provision finds its Canadian equivalent in the
enhanced charitable tax credit and deduction offered for donations of full or
partial interests in ecologically sensitive land, available under Canada’s
Income Tax Act.11 The last of the questions identified in the list of
budgetary concerns mentioned above focuses on the appropriate design
features of a tax expenditure. The Canadian approach to the design of the
tax expenditure for the donation of ecologically sensitive land might be
compared with its American counterpart as a means not of evaluating which
is more effective but simply to underline that even once the tax system has
been chosen as the appropriate instrument for achieving the identified
government objective, there is a wide spectrum of design options that need
to be canvassed.12
In Canada an individual who makes a charitable contribution usually
receives a non-refundable tax credit. The credit is calculated by applying
the lowest marginal tax rate (15% federally) to the first $200 of the
donation, and then the highest rate (29% federally) to the balance.
Generally speaking, in any one year a taxpayer cannot receive a tax credit
for charitable contributions in excess of 75% of her net income. If she has
excess credits, she can carry them forward for five years. After that, the
credits expire. In addition, if a taxpayer makes a donation of capital
property, like land, she would also have to pay tax on the capital gain
arising from the deemed disposition. For donations of ecological gifts, this
subsidy is enhanced in two ways. First, the disposition is not subject to the
75% income restriction, and second, it is not subject to capital gains tax.
In the US, the standard approach is to grant an itemizing taxpayer a
deduction equal to the value of the charitable contribution. The value of the
deduction is therefore determined by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. As in
Canada, there are limits to the total deduction available. For capital
property, the limit is usually 30% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.
As in the Canadian context, the US offers special incentives for the
donation of conservation easements. The deduction limits for those gifts
are lifted so that they can value up to 50% of adjusted gross income and the
carry forward period is 15 years.
Although there are many design features of the enhanced charitable tax
10. Supra note 6.
11. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. c. 1 (5th Supp.), subsections 118.1(3), 110.1(1) and paragraph
38(1.2), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/I/I-3.3.pdf.
12. I am deeply indebted to the thorough paper on the taxation of conservation easements
prepared by Ellen Zweibel and Karen Cooper. This section of the comment is distilled from their more
detailed work; see Ellen Zweibel and Karen Cooper, Charitable Gifts of Conservative Easements:
Lessons from the US Experience in Enhancing the Tax Incentive, CANADIAN TAX JOURNAL
(forthcoming).
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credit/deduction in the United States and Canada that might be compared,
in this comment I focus only on two: the choice of a tax credit versus a tax
deduction and the administrative oversight of the tax expenditure.
Tax expenditures may be delivered using credits, deductions,
exemptions, reduced rates, or deferral of taxation. Canada and the United
States have chosen fundamentally different design approaches for
individual donors of ecologically sensitive land.
In Canada, the
government provides a non-refundable tax credit. The credit value changes
based on the value of the donation – with one value for the first $200 and a
second value for subsequent amounts. Despite this quirky aspect of the
charitable credit, its value to the taxpayer is the same regardless of the
taxpayer’s marginal tax bracket. In other words, a taxpayer in the lowest
marginal tax bracket will receive the same implicit subsidy for his
contribution as a taxpayer in the top bracket. The US tax expenditure is
designed as a tax deduction. Thus the value of the benefit varies based on
the tax bracket of the taxpayer: the higher the taxpayer’s income, the more
the deduction is worth to her.
As an aside, neither of these approaches is ideal, but the Canadian
approach is better. As mentioned, tax expenditures are the functional
equivalent of direct grants. A government would never suggest that a highincome taxpayer should receive a larger direct grant than a low-income
taxpayer for the donation of the same piece of land; however, providing a
tax expenditure by using a tax deduction does precisely that. The Canadian
tax credit is fairer, but it is not as fair as granting a refundable credit. If a
Canadian donor does not pay tax (because she has loss carryforwards or
because she is a low-income taxpayer) then she receives no government
subsidy for her contribution.
A key issue in the design of tax expenditures is which administrative
body should oversee their enforcement. Indeed, the administration of the
tax expenditure subsidy for charitable contributions has been frequently
criticized as poorly integrated into established forms of public review;
lacking transparency; lacking oversight of what is really a private land-use
form of control; and under-resourced (for private land owners who should
be monitoring and maintaining the land subject to the easement).13 In
Canada, the ecological gifts program is administered by Environment
Canada, which, among other things, has to pre-certify the gift, including the
appraisal value. In the US, the IRS undertakes post-donation audits and
attempts to require compliance with detailed rules about the nature of the
13. BETWEEN STATE AND MARKET: ESSAYS ON CHARITIES, LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA (Jim
Phillips, Bruce Chapman & David Stevens eds., McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001).
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gift. However, recognizing that these provisions are spending provisions
that have nothing to do with the technical tax system, it would seem to
make sense for the tax subsidy for donations of ecologically sensitive land
to be administered by an environmentally sensitive government body, and
for pre-donation reviews to be conducted.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING THIS WORK
Professor Milne’s article invites tax scholars and policy makers to take
a closer look at the details of our current taxing legislation and to evaluate
their impact on the environment. She takes the important step of starting
with the environment and then asking how law, and tax law more
specifically, might be used to address some of the world’s most urgent
environmental problems. I hope others heed her call: that would be a
watershed in its own right.

